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Abstract 
Evidence-based policy making and other recent steering reforms emphasize the role of 
systematic evidence about the effectiveness and efficiency of public policies to improve 
political decisions. Increasing public deficits enhance the pressure on public authorities to 
defend public spending more profoundly and to find saving capacities. In this perspective, 
efficiency analyses are considered as an important source of information in decision making. 
Empirical studies have shown that the influence of research-based information on decision 
making is shaped by several factors, in general. However, existing studies do not distinguish 
between different types of information and mainly focus on higher officials as users of such 
information. This paper aims to asses the influence of efficiency analysis compared to 
effectiveness information dealing with the performance of public policies in revision 
processes. The underlying study is based on ten case studies of policy revision processes at 
the federal level in Switzerland. The case studies rely on process tracing of the entire policy 
reforms. This qualitative analysis sheds light on which actors use efficiency analyses in 
legislative reforms, how and under which conditions. Further, it highlights the contribution 
and significance of efficiency analysis for evidence-based policy. 
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1 Introduction1 
The question of costs and efficiency of public policies gain considerable attention in times of 
increased public deficits. Public authorities are urged to defend public spending more 
profoundly and to find saving capacities. Therefore, we could expect a high demand and use 
of efficiency analysis in public policy. Recent public steering reforms such as ‘new public 
management’, ‘governance’ or ‘evidence-based policy making’ are attempts to give more 
weight to the questions of effectiveness and efficiency of public policies. These reforms 
emphasize the need of systematic evidence to improve problem solving and (re-)ensuring 
accountability. Political decisions should be based on information about the effectiveness and 
efficiency of a policy and not only rely on the definition of resources and procedures for its 
implementation. This shift form traditional input and process criteria, like the definition of the 
resource allocation for a specific process (input) or administrative guidelines (process), to 
criteria of ‘results’ places high requirements on steering information. Furthermore, it implies 
that systematic evidence predominates political ideology or prejudice and shifts the source of 
legitimacy to evidence of performance (Sanderson 2002: 2; Widmer and Rüegg 2005: 100-
101). Not surprisingly, these steering reforms did provoke a debate about their desirability and 
feasibility (see for instance Parsons 2002, 2004, Pollitt 1995). 
This paper focuses on the empirical question of the role of efficiency analysis in legislative 
revisions at the federal level in Switzerland. It aims to assess the influence of efficiency 
analysis compared to information about the effectiveness (performance) in revision processes. 
Thereby the crucial questions are who uses efficiency analysis how and when. Such an 
analysis provides insights to a realistic view on the influence of research-based evidence in 
decision making and contributes to the understanding of challenges as well as pitfalls of 
evidence-based policy making. To distinguish between effectiveness information (‘doest it 
work?’) and efficiency information (‘is it worth it?’) and to analyze their influence in revision 
processes separately sheds light on the weight of two central dimensions of public policies in 
decision making.  
Neither the steering reforms nor the literature on evaluation utilization and policy analysis 
focussing on the role of ‘ideas’ and ‘policy learning’ did so far specify the standing of 
efficiency analysis in policy making processes. Within the steering reforms the question of 
efficiency is present but the main emphasis is placed on results. Evidence-based policy 
making is dominated by the question what policies work (Hansen and Rieper 2009) and more 
detailed, what works for whom in what circumstances (Pawson 2006: 20-25). These questions 
focus on public interventions and their consequences. It is not discussed how efficiency 
 
1  This study is part of the research project ‚Public Performance Information – Creation, Diffusion, and 
Utilization’ lead by Thomas Widmer and Heinz Bonfadelli. The project is financed by the Swiss National 
Science Foundation in the framework of the National Centre for Competence in Research ‘Challenges to 
Democracy in the 21st Century’. 
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analysis might contribute to the answer of these questions. Thus, it is not clear how the issues 
of costs and efficiency are exactly taken into account within this steering concept. This leaves 
room for at least two interpretations: First, we could assume that efficiency is treated with 
subordinate interest and thereby considered as additional, but not imperative information. 
Second, we could presume that efficiency is implicitly considered as being part of the 
evidence that should be considered for a policy decision. This paper will provide findings 
about the current standing of efficiency analysis: Are involved actors perceiving efficiency 
analysis as imperative or rather additional information? 
Empirical studies on evaluation and research utilization focus on various factors enhancing or 
hampering the uptake of a study (for syntheses see Shulha and Cousins 1997, Vedung 1997, 
Weiss 1998b; Leviton 2003; Patton 2008: 3-33). Characteristics of an evaluation such as its 
research quality or its action orientation are shown to be important factors determining 
utilization. However, this research does not differentiate between different types (contents) of 
information. Most empirical studies focus on a specific sample of evaluations (e.g. ‘ex post’ 
evaluation commissioned by defined administration units) and on a specific type of users (e.g. 
higher public officials). We propose to select revision processes and to identify the available 
relevant systematic evidence, including effectiveness and efficiency information, and to trace 
its influence in the entire processes. Such a research approach is embedded in the tradition of 
policy analysis. However, policy analyses rarely focus on the influence of clearly defined or 
even identified information sources (Webber 1991, for examples see Esterling 2004, for 
Switzerland see Klöti and Schneider 1989). 
In the next section, this paper proposes a typology of systematic evidence. Thereafter, the 
theoretical argument is outlined and three hypotheses formulated that postulate what kind of 
systematic evidence is more likely to be influential and what types of actors are more likely to 
use which type of information. In the next part of the paper, we will test these hypotheses 
based on an empirical analysis of ten revision processes at the Swiss federal level dealing with 
policy measures. Although, Switzerland might not be considered as a front-runner in 
introducing and promoting evidence-based policy making, the production of evaluations has 
increased as concomitant to various steering reforms (Widmer and Neuenschwander 2004; 
Balthasar 2007; Widmer et al. 2009). Furthermore, we can observe attempts to give more 
weight to efficiency analysis on the one hand in ‘ex post’ evaluations of federal regulations 
(Interdepartmental Group on Effectiveness Control 2004: 3), and on the other hand by the 
introduction of the formal use of regulatory impact analysis (RIA) in the legislative procedure 
in 1999 (Swiss Federal Council 1999). Thus, Switzerland might provide interesting cases for 
an empirical analysis. The main findings are summarized and the implications for further 
research are discussed in the conclusion. 
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2 Types of Systematic Evidence in Public Policy 
The terminology of systematic evidence that should be taken into account in public policy 
making is not used in a systematic and clearly defined way in the literature. Therefore, it is 
necessary to introduce the terminology that will be applied in this paper. First, we define what 
is meant by systematic evidence and second, we elaborate a typology to classify the evidence 
according its information value. 
2.1 Systematic Evidence 
Systematic evidence provides information about the effectiveness and efficiency of public 
policies measured in a systematic and transparent way. Such evidence can be addressed as 
research-based or scientific evidence in contrast to anecdotic evidence. While there seems to 
be much support for the notion of using evidence to improve public policies, we can observe 
growing disagreement and confusion about what constitutes sound and thus, credible evidence 
for decision making (Donaldson et al. 2009). The core issue of the debate is about whether 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) should be considered the gold standard for producing 
credible evidence in applied research and evaluation. In the broader sense, the crucial 
questions are what types of study designs are capable of determining causality and which 
methods are capable of demonstrating scientific rigor (Farrington 2003; Pawson 2006: 38-72). 
The definition used in this paper applies no rigorous standard of scientific quality. From a 
methodological point of view, the definition only requires that the evidence is collected and 
analysed in a systematic and transparent way. Therewith, various study designs and 
qualitative as well as quantitative methods are included in our analysis. 
2.2 Typology of Systematic Evidence 
In this paper, we focus on the distinction between so called effectiveness information dealing 
with the effects of a public policy and efficiency information providing economic information 
about a public policy. Effectiveness information deals with the question of whether a policy 
(as a measure, programme or similar) works in reaching its goal. This question ‘does it work?’ 
has to be answered before the subsequent question ‘is it worth it?’ can be examined 
(Schmidhauser et al. 2008). An efficiency analysis of a public policy is impossible without an 
assessment of its effectiveness. Thus, an efficiency analysis provides information about an 
additional dimension of a public policy and therefore, we argue that efficiency information 
has a higher information value than effectiveness information alone. We are well aware that 
such a definition of the information value is one-dimensional. It does not take into account 
that efficiency analysis, especially cost-benefit analysis (see below), are accompanied by 
increasing requirements regarding substantial and methodological assumptions. Furthermore, 
efficiency analysis delivers highly synthesized information, and thus it might be less 
informative than rich effectiveness information.  
Effectiveness (‘does it work?’) refers to the causal framework inherent in every policy and 
thus, provides information about the consequences of a policy. In policy analysis and 
evaluation, the concept of the chain of effects (e.g. Chen 1990, Mohr 1995) is broadly used to 
systematize and map the causal framework of an evaluation object such as a policy, a 
programme or a measure. It distinguishes in the first place, to which stages of the chain of 
effects of such a policy the effectiveness information is related. In this perspective, we 
distinguish mainly between input, process, output, outcome and impact with the restriction 
that information about input or process only does not represent effectiveness information. To 
be called effectiveness information the information should include at least some kind of 
information about output, outcome and/or impact (see Figure 1). Whereas output is covering 
the products and services provided directly by the programme and directed toward the 
addressees of the programme, outcome is covering the effects of the programme with the 
direct (immediate) addressees of the programme. In social service interventions output is quite 
often established in a collaborative way involving programme personal (e.g. teachers) and 
addressees (e.g. pupils). In contrast to outcome, impact stands for the effects with other 
parties than the directly involved, or in other words with people beyond the immediately 
addressed. Naturally, in many cases there is more than one output, outcome or impact. Public 
policies such as social programmes produce usually a series of services, products and effects. 
Therefore, effectiveness is a multi-faceted concept that could rarely be captured by one 
dimension only. 
Figure 1: Chain of effects 
input process output impact outcome 
effectiveness information 
efficiency information 
 
Whereas effectiveness relates to information about output, outcome and/or impact only, 
efficiency concerns the relation between the input and the effectiveness of a given policy. In 
terms of effectiveness, the literature further distinguishes between effectiveness in general on 
the one hand including all kind of effects within or beyond the goals of the programme and, 
on the other hand effectivity, dealing with the question if the goals set have been accomplished 
or not. If effectivity is measured in a metric way, we use as well the term ‘goal attainment 
scaling’.2
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2  Furthermore, we can distinguish as well between effectiveness and efficacy. The former is used to describe 
the impact of the programme under real conditions (i.e. in everyday life) whereas the latter denotes the impact 
under idealistic circumstances. Since we are focusing on empirical studies, efficacy is of minor interest in the 
given context. 
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In contrast to the other concepts mentioned so far, efficiency is including the input side as 
well. The meaning of efficiency is always dealing in some way with the proportion between 
the input (‘the costs’) on the one hand and the output, outcome and/or impact on the other 
hand (see Figure 1). The meaning of high efficiency is to reach an optimum of effectiveness 
(output, outcome and/or impact) with the smallest resources (input) possible. In the efficiency 
domain (also called economic evaluation) four types of evaluation studies are distinguished, 
namely (Weiss 1998a: 330):3  
- cost-benefit analysis (short CBA; ‘Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse’; benefit-cost analysis, see 
Stufflebeam/Shinkfield 2007: 178-80): “A type of economic evaluation in which both 
costs and consequences of a program or set of programs are expressed and compared 
in monetary terms.“ (Weiss 1998a: 329) 
- cost-minimization analysis: “A type of economic evaluation that weighs costs of a 
variety of programmatic approaches to determine the least expensive alternative to 
accomplish a defined outcome.” (Weiss 1998a: 329) 
- cost-effectiveness analysis (‘Kosten-Wirksamkeits-Analyse’): “A type of economic 
evaluation in which costs and consequences of a program or a set of programs with 
similar aims are compared. Costs are expressed in monetary terms while program 
consequences are expressed in their natural units …” (Weiss 1998a: 329)  
- cost-utility analysis: “A type of economic evaluation that compares costs and 
consequences of a set of programs. The program consequences are expressed in terms 
of utility – the value or worth of a specific outcome for an individual, group, or 
society.” (Weiss 1998a: 329) 
However, this list of different types of efficiency analysis is not exhaustive and the respective 
terminology used in the literature is by far not homogenous (for alternative classifications see 
for example Suchman, 1967: 61-71; Simon 1976: 180-1; Clarke and Dawson 1999: 142-5; 
Poister 2004: 99-102; Rossi et al. 2004: 331-368). Furthermore, the types of efficiency 
analysis put forward in the literature overlap each other. Therefore, we propose to distinguish 
only between two forms of efficiency analysis, namely whether the consequences are 
measured in natural units (e.g. in life years gained or cases of injuries or fatalities prevented) 
on the one hand or transformed into a monetary value on the other hand. 
The complexity of the task to define (or measure) the costs of an evaluation object are often 
underestimated (see Corry 1997), since the following characteristics of costs have to be taken 
into account (Posavac/Carey 1989: 193-208): 
1. variable versus fixed costs 
2. incremental versus sunk costs  
3. recurring versus nonrecurring costs 
 
3  Furthermore, Evert Vedung proposes to distinguish between these efficiency models on the one hand and a 
productivity model on the other (Vedung 1997: 35-92, esp. 36 and 83-85). In a productivity analysis the question 
is oriented towards the ratio of output per unit of input. Or in a different wording, the crucial question in a 
productivity model is how to get the most expressed in output with one monetary unit invested? 
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4. hidden versus manifest (or obvious) costs 
5. direct versus indirect costs 
In addition, costs are always time-dependent. Therefore we can distinguish as well between 
past, current and future costs. As a result, seldom the costs of a programme can simply be 
defined by a single number of monetary units. Nevertheless, to catch the costs is usually the 
easier task than to cover the consequences of a given activity (a programme, a project or 
whatever the evaluation object is).  
In contrast to other evaluation approaches, efficiency analyses are to a relatively high 
proportion prospectively oriented and not retrospectively, as it is common practice in 
effectiveness analyses. It is quite a wide spread practice to conduct ‘ex ante efficiency 
analysis’ in the planning and design phase of an initiative (Rossi et al. 2004: 336-9). We will 
take into consideration in the following ‘ex ante’ as well as ‘ex post’ analyses. 
In order to classify and value systematic evidence about ‘what works’ and ‘is it worth it’, we 
introduce the following matrix that integrates the main distinctions mentioned above. Thus, 
we distinguish between nine types of information that a study can provide. We propose to 
value these nine types based on the assumption that information measuring input and impact 
in monetary terms (cost-benefit analysis CBA) has the highest value, and information on 
output alone the lowest value. The values for the other types of information (boxes) express 
how many steps of investigation have to be conducted to reach a CBA. In most decision 
making processes, the situation of available systematic evidence will not be perfect, and thus, 
in the individual processes only some of the information types will be covered by existing 
studies. At the level of a decision making process, we can therefore express the coverage of 
information types by the available systematic evidence by the sum of the values of the 
covered types. 
Table 1: Information Value-Matrix  
 measure of input measure of effects output outcome impact 
money 3 4 5 Efficiency information money  
natural units 2 3 4 
Effectiveness information resources/no information natural units/money 1 2 3 
Values: Ordinal scale for the information value based on the assumption that information measuring input 
and impact in monetary terms (cost-benefit analysis CBA) has the highest value, and information on output 
alone the lowest value. The values between these two extremes express how many steps of analysis have to 
be conducted to reach a CBA. 
 
3 Theoretical Framework 
In general, two streams of literature deal with the question of the influence of knowledge in 
public decision making: The evaluation and utilization research literature on the one hand and 
the policy analysis literature concerned with ‘ideas’, ‘policy learning’ or more recently 
‘diffusion’ on the other hand. In both traditions, we find various approaches how to 
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conceptualize and measure ‘use’ (see for syntheses Shulha and Cousins 1997, Vedung 1997, 
Weiss 1986, 1998a and 1998b, Leviton 2003) or ‘influence’ (Kirkhart 2000, Henry and Mark 
2003, Mark and Henry 2004) of research-based information on policy making. In policy 
analysis, the concept of the influence of ideas or the conceptualization of learning and 
diffusion is still ambiguous (Bennett and Howlett 1992, Radaelli 1995, James and Lodge 
2003). This study proposes a pragmatic approach to cope with this cognitive phenomenon 
(Surel 2000). We conceptualize the ‘influence’ of systematic evidence at the level of a 
revision process. Systematic evidence is defined as influential if it is ‘used’ by the involved 
actors (see Mark and Henry 2004; Balthasar 2009: 238-239) and therewith present in policy 
documents (like policy drafts, statements in consultation procedure, minutes etc.) or interview 
statements. To be considered as influential at the level of a revision process, the revision has 
to correspond with the systematic evidence, the evidence has to be ready and accessible for 
use by policy makers in a timely manner and the involved actors have to assess systematic 
evidence as influential. The influence of systematic evidence defined in these terms indicates 
to which extent systematic evidence contributes to the explanation of the political decision 
taken by the involved actors. With the notion of involved actors a comprehensive approach is 
followed including not only members of the government and the parliament but also civil 
servants, interest groups, and non-governmental organizations. 
Existing research did so far not propose a distinction between different types of systematic 
evidence such as effectiveness and efficiency information. Thus, it is unclear whether the 
influence of systematic evidence depends on the type of information provided. What 
constitutes powerful knowledge in a revision processes? Utilization research answered this 
question by the investigation of several factors determining evaluation use including among 
others characteristics of an evaluation itself (e.g. Shulha and Cousins 1997, Vedung 1997, 
Weiss 1986, 1998a and 1998b; Balthasar 2007 and 2009). Characteristics of evaluation were 
defined content-independent and included for instance its scientific quality or its timeliness. 
This research is only partially relevant for the focus of our study that differentiates not only 
between different types of systematic evidence but is interested as well in the influence of the 
available types of systematic evidence at the level of a revision process. Thus, the state of 
knowledge respectively the information value expressing the coverage of types of systematic 
evidence is argued to explain the influence of systematic evidence in a revision process: 
H1: Systematic evidence with a high value of information and thus, including not only 
effectiveness information but also efficiency information, is more likely to play a 
crucial role in a revision process. 
If the available systematic evidence includes not only effectiveness but also efficiency 
information and covers output, outcome and impact, the uncertainty of the chain of effects of 
a policy measure is reduced to a minimum and such systematic evidence is considered to be 
more influential (Esterling 2004). This conceptualization of the state of available systematic 
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evidence reflects relevant categories of the chain of effects. In this way, it concentrates on the 
crucial question if available systematic evidence effectively provides knowledge about 
whether a policy measure has the intended effects among the direct addressees and whether it 
contributes to solve the problem in an efficient way or, if it shows only how public services 
(output) are provided. Literature about the implementation of new public management (Pollitt 
1995; Widmer and Rüegg 2005: 88) and of evidence-based policy making (Sanderson 2002; 
Parsons 2004) stresses the weakness of simplified output measurements that are not 
satisfactory to fulfil the complex task of public policy making in modern democracies. 
However, this conceptualization reflects only one dimension that might shape the influence of 
systematic evidence in a revision process. Other dimensions such as the ambiguity (Esterling 
2004), the quality or timeliness of the state of knowledge (Shulha and Cousins 1997, Vedung 
1997, Weiss 1986 and 1998b) that have been proven to be important determinants are not 
considered by this conceptualization. 
As argued above, any influence of systematic evidence including efficiency analysis 
originates from the information processing behaviour of the involved actors. Therefore, 
hypothesis 2 and 3 are formulated at the level of types of actors. Existing research mainly 
concentrates on one type of actors, namely higher officials (see Pollitt 2006), and thus, 
investigates ‘human factors’ including their educational backgrounds and organizational 
positions (see for instance Amara et al. 2004). The focus on entire policy revision rather calls 
for an analysis of different types of actors. We propose to differentiate on the one hand 
between generalists like elected members of the government and parliament but also higher 
public officials and specialists like programme managers, programme personal or 
representatives of non-governmental organization involved in the formulation, 
implementation and evaluation of a concrete policy measure. On the other hand, it is of 
interest to include political ideology considerations by distinguishing between proponents and 
opponents of a select policy revision (see also Esterling 2004). 
The following hypothesis 2 deals with the distinction between generalists and specialists. 
H2: Generalists are more likely to use efficiency information whereas specialists are 
more likely to use effectiveness information. 
We argue that generalists, especially elected politicians, are more sensitive for costs than civil 
servants directly responsible for the concrete policy measure. Higher costs increase the 
prestige of the responsible civil servants whereas for politicians costly programmes have 
higher opportunity costs and – from time to time – bring the risk to be criticised by the public 
for high public expenditures. Furthermore, efficiency analysis especially cost-benefit analysis 
provide highly condensed (and simplified) information about a policy or even policy 
alternatives that might be especially helpful for generalists who have to decide between 
different policy alternatives and to set priorities. In contrast, specialists like civil servants and 
third parties responsible for the implementation of a policy seem to be more interested in 
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effectiveness information showing how to improve a policy measure. In other words, on the 
one hand, these two types of actors have different needs for information according to their 
decision competencies. On the other hand efficiency information has different implications 
for these two types of actors. Evaluation utilization research has demonstrated that the ‘action 
orientation’ of an evaluation affects utilization (Weiss and Bucuvalas 1980, Balthasar 2007). 
However, ‘action orientation’ is conceptualized within existing research content-independent 
for instance with criteria like an evaluation ‘contains explicit recommendations’ or ‘analyzes 
effects of factors that decision-makers can do something about’ (Weiss and Bucuvalas 1980: 
304). 
Hypothesis 3 provides a further perspective to the use of efficiency information in policy 
revisions by differentiating between proponents and opponents. It argues: 
H3: Opponents of a policy measure and/or its revision are more likely to use efficiency 
information whereas proponents are more likely to use effectiveness information. 
This hypothesis relates to the findings that actors use research-based information in political 
decision processes opportunistically to support or reject a specific alternative (Esterling 2004, 
Frey 2009, Askim 2008). Or, to put it in the words used by Carol Weiss and Michael 
Bucuvalas (1980), utility of the information is as important as its truthfulness. Thus, involved 
actors use efficiency analysis only if they consider it as powerful ammunition for their 
position. It is a common means to criticize a policy for its high costs and its poor efficiency, 
where it is a much weaker argument to put forward low costs in order to support a policy. 
Nevertheless, proponents of a policy alternative might be interested to legitimate their policy 
choice not only with effectiveness information but also with efficiency information, especially 
when they expect strong opposition. Opponents might not want to invest considerable 
resources for the production of a cost-benefit analysis. These remarks indicate that we have to 
take into account also the creation of systematic evidence to understand the role of systematic 
evidence in policy revisions more profoundly. 
4 Research Design and Method 
The empirical analysis is based on a comparative case study approach (Yin 2003). A case is 
thereby defined as a revision process of a policy measure. A policy measure consists of a goal 
and a set of activities (instruments) aiming to influence a specific target population in the 
desired way. Hence, a policy measure is thought to operate through a set of causal beliefs 
(hypotheses) and can be illustrated by a ‘chain of effects’. A decision about a single policy 
measure is influenced by other decisions taking place in the same revision process. Therefore 
an embedded case study approach seems to be most appropriate (Yin 2003). 
The empirical analysis presented in this paper draws on data of ten qualitative case studies 
conducted in a larger research project that investigates the influence of systematic evidence in 
legislative revisions in Switzerland with a more comprehensive approach (see Footnote 1, 
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Frey 2008, 2009; Widmer 2009). In this research project, we applied a most dissimilar case 
strategy and selected cases in three different policy fields allowing performing inter- and 
intra-policy comparisons. In a nutshell, we selected the two most recent terminated legislative 
revisions within three policy fields that have different affinities to technology respectively 
ideology. Therewith, we could test the hypothesis that systematic evidence is more likely to 
be influential in legislative revision in policy fields with a high affinity to technology. By the 
selection of the two most recent terminated revisions in each policy field, we concentrated on 
the current state of information processing within legislative revisions at the federal level in 
Switzerland. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the selected policy measures in the fields of traffic safety, health 
and asylum policy. If possible we selected more than one policy measure of a revision process 
to cover the process more profoundly and to deepen the analyses. However, not every revision 
process comprised more than one policy measure with available systematic evidence as 
defined in section 2. 
Table 2: Selected cases of revisions of policy measures 
Field Revision, year of final decision Policy measure (case) Case 
no. 
Ordinance ‘30 kph Zones’, 2001 Speed limitation in residential areas 1 
Cascade system: Administrative sanctions for repeat 
offenders 
2 Law on Road Traffic, 2001 
 
Introduction of a two-phase driver-training licensing 
system 
3 
Traffic 
Ordinance on BAC limit, 2003 Reduction of the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit 
to 0,05 % 
4 
Law on Sickness Insurance, 2008 2nd Extension of the ‘moratorium’ for new medical 
services providers 
5 Health 
Law on Narcotics and 
Psychotropic substances, 2008 
Heroin-assisted treatment 6 
Social assistance exclusion of all asylum seekers whose 
applications were not considered for formal reason (non-
entry decision). 
7 Austerity Program, 2003 
More severe coercive measures 8 
Social assistance exclusion of all rejected asylum seekers 9 
Asylum 
Law on Asylum, 2005 
More severe coercive measures 10 
 
The data collection and analysis was organized and guided by a case study protocol (Yin 
2003) and was based on document analysis and expert interviews. Document analysis 
included the study of three different types of documents. First, documents (studies, reports 
and similar) containing systematic evidence about the selected policy measures were 
identified and analysed to answer the questions what types of systematic evidence was 
available, when and produced by whom. Second, the revision processes were reconstructed by 
the analysis of documents containing information about the cases (i.e. the decision making 
processes) including secondary and grey literature. Third, all references to systematic 
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evidence in policy documents containing actor’s positions, such as actors’ responses in 
official consultations or minutes of parliamentary debates, were coded to see whether 
involved actors did cite systematic evidence. In addition, we conducted a total of 45 
interviews with key actors involved in the revision processes. The interviews covered the 
following four groups of actors: Civil servants, producers of systematic evidence or 
researchers, non-governmental organizations and parliamentarians who were members of the 
committees in charge of the select revisions.4
5 Available Types of Systematic Evidence  
To identify existing systematic evidence about each policy measure, we first specified the 
chain of effects by defining the respective contents of output, outcome and impact for each 
policy measure. Figure 2 provides an example of the chain of effects of the policy measure 
‘speed limitation in residential areas’. The figure is based on document analysis and includes 
expectations about the effects put forward by the involved actors as well as the effects 
investigated by systematic evidence. Second, we defined the relevant publication periods for 
each policy measure starting after the enactment of the legislation under revision and ending 
prior to the adoption of the revised legislation. In this paper, we further focus only on 
systematic evidence accessible to the involved actors that investigates the implementation of 
public policies and their consequences in Switzerland. Based on these definitions, we 
conducted an electronic research including library catalogues, data bases as well as internet 
sites of research institutions and of actors of the respective policy fields to find the documents 
containing systematic evidence. Thus, our study includes systematic evidence commissioned 
and produced by state actors as well as other public or private actors. 
 
4  The composition of interviewees is displayed in Table 9 in the appendix. 
Figure 2: Chain of effects of the policy measure ‘speed limitation in residential areas’ (case no. 1) 
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In total, we identified 55 studies containing systematic evidence about the selected policy 
measures in the relevant periods of time (Table 3).5 Twelve or 22 percent of the studies 
contain apart from effectiveness information also some information about the efficiency of the 
respective policy measure. Table 3 shows what type of systematic evidence the studies 
provide: Nearly three-fourths of the studies contain systematic and transparent evidence about 
the effects with the direct (immediate) addressees of the policy measures (outcome) and half 
of the studies provide some information about the effects with people beyond the immediately 
addressed or in other words, whether the policy measure achieved an improvement of the 
problem at the level of the society (impact). In contrast, only few studies contain systematic 
and transparent evidence about the input expressed in monetary terms (‘costs’) and thus 
provide some economic information put into relation with the output, outcome and/or impact. 
Efficiency analyses measuring input and impact in monetary terms, so called cost-benefit 
analyses, are provided only by five out of 55 studies. 
Table 3: Overview of Available Types of Systematic Evidence 
 measure of input measure of effects Output Outcome Impact 
money   5 (9%) efficiency information money 
natural units 8 (15%) 7 (13%) 5 (9%) 
effectiveness information non-monetary/no information natural units/money 28 (50%) 45 (82%) 28 (50%)
Values: Number of studies containing the respective type of systematic evidence, (% of studies) 
Total number of studies: 55 
 
The finding that only few studies provide efficiency information might be explained by a 
weak tradition of ‘ex ante’ evaluation of the federal authority (see also Klöti and Schneider 
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5  We included only the final reports of a study and related articles if they provide additional findings; interim 
reports or journal articles that diffused results of the final reports only were not included. 
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1989, Janett 2004: 148, Duperrut 2005). We found not any ‘ex ante’ evaluation. However, this 
could also be an implication of the focus of our study that concentrates on policy revisions 
rather than introduction of innovative, new policies where ‘ex ante’ evaluation might be more 
widespread. The finding that only few ‘ex post’ evaluations provide efficiency information 
corresponds to the findings of Balthasar (2007: 437). He observed in his study that only 2 
percent of 278 ‘ex post’ evaluations commissioned by the federal authority between 1999 and 
2002 focused on questions of efficiency. ‘Ex post’ evaluations might deal less frequently with 
efficiency because they are often produced shortly after the introduction of a policy and 
therefore, concentrate on implementation and effectiveness (ibid.). Furthermore, 
commissioners of a study, especially civil servants managing the respective policy measures, 
might avoid the costs but also the potential implications of the findings of an efficiency 
analysis. As argued in the theoretical section, the civil servants responsible for the planning 
and implementation of a policy measure are mainly interested to improve the policy measure 
and thus, focus primarily on questions of effectiveness. 
The available amount and types of available systematic evidence varied considerably between 
the different policy revision processes. The following Table 4 provides the information value-
matrices about two policy measures to illustrate the differences.6 In the case of ‘speed 
limitation in residential areas’ (No. 1) the available fifteen studies covered together seven out 
of nine types of systematic evidence and thus, we calculated a high information value of 20.7 
No study provided information about the cost-benefit relation between input and output 
respectively between input and outcome. Most of the studies delivered information about the 
achieved speed reduction in the residential area (outcome, see also Figure 2 on page 13) and 
about the improvements in traffic safety measured in terms of reductions of accidents, injuries 
or fatalities (impact). In contrast, only one study provided a cost-benefit analysis and showed 
the relation between the introduction costs of a speed limitation zone and the prevented costs 
of accidents and causalities in monetary terms (Lindenmann and Koy 2000). In the case of 
‘more severe coercive measure I’ (No. 8) only two studies provided systematic evidence 
about the output and the outcome. It was only measured if and how cantonal authorities did 
apply coercive measures (mainly detention pending removal) in the removal procedure of 
rejected asylum seekers (Swiss Refugee Council 1995) and if coercive measures did deter 
potential asylum seeker to come to Switzerland (Efionayi-Mäder et al. 2001). For instance, 
there was no systematic evidence about the main goal of this policy measure available, 
namely if detention pending removal did guarantee efficient removal after detention. Thus, 
systematic evidence has a comparably low information value with respect of the covered 
types of systematic information in this case. 
 
6  The information value-matrices for the other investigated policy measures are provided in Table 10 to Table 
12 in the appendix. 
7  The information value (20) expresses the coverage of available types of systematic evidence and is 
calculated by the sum of the values of the covered types as defined in the information value-matrix, see Table 1 
on page 7. 
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Table 4: Information value-matrices for two selected policy measures 
Case no. 1, Policy measure ‘speed limitation in residential areas’ (Total number of studies : 15) 
 measure of input measure of effects output outcome impact 
money   1 efficiency information money  
natural units 3 2 2 
effectiveness information non-monetary/no information natural units/money 5 11 9 
Values: Number of studies containing the respective information type 
Value of information type coverage: 20 
Case no. 8, Policy measure ‘more severe coercive measures I’ (Total number of studies : 2) 
 measure of input measure of effects output outcome impact 
money    efficiency information money  
natural units    
effectiveness information Non-monetary/no information natural units/money 1 1  
Values: Number of studies of the respective information type 
Value of information type coverage: 3 
 
The following Table 5 displays condensed information about all the policy measures, and 
shows that only in six out of ten cases efficiency information was available. Efficiency 
information exists about all traffic safety cases, whereas only one case in each of the two 
other policy fields is covered by efficiency information. In the field of health policy, we 
investigated only two cases and therefore the finding has to be interpreted with caution. In 
contrast, the finding about the asylum policy field is quite explicit: Neither the production of 
efficiency information nor effectiveness information seems to be institutionalized in the field 
of asylum policy (see Zollinger 2009). This finding is also emphasized by the last column of 
Table 5 that displays the information value expressing the coverage of available types of 
systematic evidence per policy measure: Less and lower types of systematic evidence was 
available in the asylum policy revisions compared to the traffic safety revisions. 
Table 5: Available Systematic Evidence about the individual policy measures 
Case 
no. 
Policy measure (case) Period SE available 
(number of 
studies) 
EI available Number of 
studies with 
EI 
Information 
value: Cove-
rage of types 
of SE* 
1 Speed limitation in residential areas 1989 – 01 15  yes 4 20 
2 Cascade system 1990 – 01 1 yes 1 12 
3 Two-phase driver-training system 1990 – 01 4 yes 1 14 
4 BAC limit 1980 – 03 3 yes 1 15 
5 Moratorium for new services 
providers 
2001 – 08 4 no 0 6 
6 Heroin-assisted treatment 1998 – 08 17 yes 6 20 
7 Social assistance exclusion 1999 – 03 4 no 0 3 
8 Coercive measures I 1994 – 03 2 no 0 3 
9 Extended social assistance exclusion 2004 – 05 5 no 0 6 
10 Coercive measures II 2004 – 05 5 yes 1 11 
SE = systematic evidence; EI = efficiency information 
* The value is calculated based on the coverage of the available types of systematic evidence as defined by the 
information value-matrix in Table 1 on page 7. 
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To sum up, our analyses show that production neither of effectiveness nor efficiency 
information can be taken for granted and varies considerably between the cases. In the 
following section, we investigate how the availability of different types of systematic 
evidence affects the role of systematic evidence in the revision processes. 
6 Influence of Systematic Evidence in Legislative Revisions 
To trace the influence of systematic evidence in legislative revisions is a complex and 
difficult task because it is a cognitive phenomenon that can not be observed and measured 
directly (Davies et al. 2005; Weiss 1981). As mentioned in the methodological section, we 
used qualitative methods to trace the influence of systematic evidence at the level of the 
revision processes (also known as process tracing, see George and Bennett 2005: 205-232, 
Gerring 2007: 172-185). Thus, we analysed who referred to what type of systematic evidence 
at what stage of the processes by conducting interviews and document analysis. This analysis 
provides data about the presence of systematic evidence in the revisions. To further assess the 
influence of systematic evidence in the decision making process, we ask the interviewees to 
estimate the influence of systematic evidence and we analysed whether the decision went in 
the direction as proposed by the systematic evidence or not.8 This analysis provides data to 
test hypothesis 1 formulated at the level of the revision process as well as to investigate 
hypotheses 2 and 3 at the level of actor types. 
6.1 Does Efficiency Information Make a Difference? 
Hypothesis 1 argues that if systematic evidence was available about both, effectiveness and 
efficiency, it is more likely to be influential in a revision process because more 
comprehensive information is available and therewith the uncertainty related to the policy 
measure is reduced.  
The following Table 6 displays the findings of the case studies and shows that the influence of 
systematic evidence varied between the individual revisions of the policy measures. In six 
cases, the information value expressing the coverage of available types of systematic evidence 
corresponds as postulated to the level of influence: In cases where efficiency analysis was 
(not) available, a high (low) level of influence of systematic evidence in the revision process 
was observed. For one case (No. 3), hypothesis 1 is supported partially, because the 
availability of efficiency information was accompanied only by a moderate level of influence 
of systematic evidence. The hypothesis is not supported for three cases (No. 2, 4 and 10). In 
order to discuss possible explanations for these mixed results and to trace causality, we 
provide detailed information from the case studies in the next section. 
 
8  More details about the operationalization of the levels of influence are displayed in Table 6 on page 17. 
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Table 6: Types of systematic evidence and influence of systematic evidence in the revisions processes 
Case 
no. 
Policy measure (case) Studies 
with SE
EI 
available 
Coverage of 
SE types 
(information 
value) 
Influence of 
SE in the 
revision* 
Support 
for H1 
1 Speed limitation in residential areas 15 yes 20 high yes 
2 Cascade system 1 yes 12 low no 
3 Two-phase driver-training system 4 yes 14 moderate partially 
4 BAC limit 3 yes 15 low no 
5 Moratorium for new services providers 4 no 6 no influence yes 
6 Heroin-assisted treatment 17 yes 20 high yes 
7 Social assistance exclusion 4 no 3 low yes 
8 Coercive measures I 2 no 3 not present yes 
9 Extended social assistance exclusion 5 no 6 low yes 
10 Coercive measures II 5 yes 11 no influence no 
SE = systematic evidence, EI = efficiency information 
* Operationalization of the level of influence: not present = no traces of SE neither in interviews nor in official 
documents; no influence = interviewees attributed no influence to SE, and the revision is not consistent with the 
main findings of the SE; low influence = interviewees attributed only low influence to SE, no references to SE in 
official policy documents; moderate influence = interviewees attributed some influence to SE, few references to 
SE in official policy documents; high influence = interviewees attributed high influence to SE, few/some refe-
rences to SE in official policy documents. 
 
As briefly outlined in the theoretical section, the available types of systematic evidence (the 
respective information value) is not the only factor shaping the influence of systematic 
evidence in a revision process. Several factors might hamper while other factors might 
enforce the influence of systematic evidence in a revision process at the same time (see Frey 
2008, 2009, for syntheses Shulha and Cousins 1997, Vedung 1997, Weiss 1986, 1998a and 
1998b). It is not easy to disentangle the power of one factor that might even be disguised or 
neutralized by other factors. Our findings clearly indicate that the factor ‘high information 
value’ is not the most powerful factor that prevails in every case. But the questions whether 
this factor is necessary, that systematic evidence can become influential in a policy revision is 
not yet answered. 
The two cases ‘speed limitation in residential areas’ (No. 1) and ‘heroin assisted treatment’ 
(No. 6) where we observed both, a high information value and high level of influence of 
systematic evidence, do not provide striking support that efficiency information did make the 
difference. In both cases, interviewees rather emphasized the relevance of effectiveness 
information showing that these policy measures effectively lead to an improvement of the 
problem. The case ‘heroin assisted treatment’ (No. 6) deals with the institutionalization of 
heroin-assisted treatment for chronic addicts resistant to other treatments in 2008 prior 
introduced timely restricted and in form of a research trial. This case study shows that the 
Federal Office of Public Health pursued an evidence-based approach by commissioning 
several studies conducted by an independent group of researcher accompanied by an external 
scientific board. The studies investigated several consequences of the treatment and showed 
positive effects on patients’ health as well as the reduction of drug-related delinquency and of 
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the nuisance from open drug scenes (see for example Güttinger et al. 2002, Killias et al. 
2002). Interviewees emphasized that they were quite surprised that the efficiency analysis 
showing the cost-utility relation in monetary terms (Swiss Federal Office of Public Health 
2007) did not attract much attention and thus, was not as relevant as they had expected. The 
analysis of the parliamentary minutes support this assessment, there are only very few and 
vague references to efficiency analysis (see also Table 7 on page 20). However, the 
interviewees shared the opinion that the comprehensiveness and credibility of systematic 
evidence was the foundation for its high influence, especially in the case of such a polarized 
issue. 
The case ‘speed limitation in residential areas’ (No. 1) deals with the revision of the directive 
that defined the implementation procedures and the requirements concerning different 
accompanying measures (e.g. physical measures such as horizontal offsets) of so called ‘30 
kph zone’. The study that provided a cost-benefit analysis (Lindenmann and Koy 2000) was 
mentioned by several actors as the most influential study in this revision process. However, 
this study (ibid.) provided rich effectiveness information and references to this information 
type were more frequent in interviews and documents. We found no references to the 
efficiency information in official policy documents and interviewees considered the question 
of efficiency only as secondary issue in this revision. In the other traffic safety cases including 
the reduction of the legal blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit to 0,05 percent (No. 4), 
more severe sanctions of repeat offenders (cascade system; No. 2), and the introduction of a 
second phase of driving-training (No. 3), systematic evidence achieved only a low and in the 
later case a moderate level of influence although efficiency analyses were available. This can 
be explained by the fact, that the analysis (Eckhardt and Seitz 1998) covering all three 
measures was published not until the end of the pre-parliamentary phase, thus after the 
revisions were already largely defined, and was not used intensively because it was 
considered as not credible in methodological terms.  
Finally, the case study of ‘coercive measure II’ (No. 10) deals among other with the doubling 
of the maximal duration from nine to eighteen months for detention pending deportation. The 
available efficiency information shows mixed results for the cost-effectiveness of imprisoning 
rejected asylum seekers who refuse to follow the order to leave Switzerland. Detention is only 
cost-effective when the duration of detention was shorter than three months, longer detention 
was linked to high costs but high rate of unsuccessful removal (Parliamentary Administration 
Control 2005: 53). This analysis was produced and published very late, namely at the time 
when the two chambers of the Federal Parliament ironed already their differences out. It was 
taken up and discussed by politicians, officials of the federal administration and it attracted 
considerably media attention (see Frey 2009). However, the analysis was not influential due 
to the fact, that the duration of the detention pending deportation was doubled. The low 
influence of efficiency information as well as effectiveness information in this revision 
process can mainly be explained by the high polarization and ideological connotation of this 
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revision process. Furthermore, the available existing evidence had in general according to our 
systematic not a very high information value and only few studies were available compared to 
the cases with a high influence. 
In all other cases, where no efficiency information was available and related to a low 
information value, systematic evidence was as postulated not present or not influential. 
We can conclude that efficiency information was in the investigated revision processes rather 
of secondary interest. Of course, our empirical analyses are based only on a restricted number 
of cases, and a high level of influence of systematic evidence was found only in two cases. In 
these two cases with a high influence of systematic evidence, the available efficiency 
information supported the revisions of the policy measures and as argued in the theoretical 
section, we rather expected opponents to use efficiency information. This hypothesis will be 
tested in the next section. 
6.2 Who Uses Efficiency Analysis? 
We argued theoretically that generalists like the members of the Federal Council and the 
Federal Parliament but also higher public officials are more likely to be interested in 
efficiency analysis than specialists involved in the formulation, implementation and 
evaluation of a concrete policy measures. Generalists have to decide between different 
alternatives and to set priorities. Efficiency analysis provides information that can contribute 
to such decisions. Specialists might produce, diffuse and use efficiency analysis to justify 
their policy but are far more interested in information about the effectiveness of a policy 
measure and potentials to improve it.  
Table 7 shows that hypothesis 2 holds at least partially for the six investigated revisions where 
we have observed efficiency information: In these cases, existing efficiency analyses were 
considered by the specialists or more concretely by the civil servants in charge of the 
revisions as not very important. In four out of six cases (No. 2, 3, 4 and 10), they explained 
that the efficiency analyses were not credible from a methodological point of view and thus, 
they did consider them as not relevant. This holds not only true for efficiency information not 
supporting the revision elaborated by the federal office in charge (No. 10) but also for 
efficiency information justifying the elaborated revisions (No. 2, 3 and 4).9 Furthermore, in 
these four cases civil servants did neither commission nor accompany the production of the 
efficiency analyses. In the case of ‘coercive measure II’ (No. 10) the efficiency analysis was 
produced by the Control Committee of the National Council, in the traffic safety cases by the 
Swiss Competence Centre for Accident Prevention. In the two other cases (No. 1 and 6) the 
federal office in charge did either commission or in the later case closely accompany the 
 
9  As mentioned above, in the cases No. 2, 3, and 4, the available efficiency information was provided by one 
individual study (Eckhardt and Seitz 1998). Although, the civil servants in charge were in favour of the 
revisions, they did not want to justify the revisions in front of the parliament by this study because of its 
contested quality. 
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efficiency analysis. Nevertheless, efficiency information was considered as less relevant 
compared to effectiveness information in these two cases too. Not surprisingly, involved 
specialized non-governmental organizations did promote the creation or at least the diffusion 
of efficiency analyses supporting their position. 
Table 7: Users of efficiency information (EI): Generalists vs. specialists 
Case 
no. 
Policy measure (case) Generalists 
Politicians, persons with a 
general perspective 
Specialists 
Persons involved in the 
implementation 
Support 
for H2 
1 Speed limitation in 
residential areas 
Low involvement;  
no parliamentary phase 
Considered EI as secondary 
issue; 
No EI in policy documents. 
partially 
2 Cascade system No references to EI in 
parliamentary debate. 
partially 
3 Two-phase driver-training 
system 
No references to EI in 
parliamentary debate. 
Civil servants: considered EI 
as secondary issue, criticized 
its quality; 
No EI in policy documents; 
SCCAP: produced, diffused 
EI. 
partially 
4 BAC limit Very few references to EI in 
parliamentary debate. 
Civil servants: considered EI 
as secondary issue, one 
reference to EI in a official 
documents, criticized its 
quality: 
SCCAP: produced, diffused 
EI 
yes 
6 Heroin-assisted treatment Very few, vague references to 
EI in parliamentary debate. 
Involved actors: considered 
EI as secondary issue. 
yes 
10 Coercive measures II Few references to EI in 
parliamentary debate; 
EI was commissioned by the 
Control Committee of the 
National Council. 
Civil servants: were not 
interested in EI, criticized its 
quality; 
NGOs opposed the revision 
considered EI as relevant. 
yes 
EI = Efficiency information; BAC = Blood alcohol concentration; SCCA = Swiss Competence Centre for 
Accident Prevention. 
Operationalization: References to EI in parliamentary debates, official policy documents (documents of the 
consultation procedure, messages (policy proposals) of the Federal Council to the Federal Parliament), 
assessments of the relevance of EI by the interviewees. 
 
Hypothesis 2 is only partially supported by half of the cases (No. 1, 2 and 3): One the one 
hand, the case ‘speed limitation in residential areas’ (No. 1) does not provide data on 
politicians because the Federal Parliament was only marginally involved in the revision 
process of a Federal Directive that can be amended by the Federal Council. On the other hand, 
we found no evidence that members of the parliament did use efficiency information in the 
cases ‘cascade system’ (No. 2) and ‘two-phase driver-training system’ (No. 3). Thus, in these 
cases the existing efficiency information was considered as relevant neither by specialist nor 
generalists. Finally, in three cases (No. 4, 6, and 10) we found few and sometimes very vague 
references to efficiency information in parliaments debates that indicate some interests in such 
information by generalists. However, members of the parliament did more often refer to 
effectiveness than to efficiency information also in these cases. Interviews with members of 
the parliamentary committees in charge of the revisions further showed that interviewees had, 
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even if, very limited knowledge of systematic evidence. Most of them could not remember a 
concrete study and attributed rather limited influence to systematic evidence at the level of 
parliamentary debates. 
To sum up, our case studies indicate that specialists such as programme managers are less 
interested in efficiency information. However, we found only thin evidence that generalists 
respectively members of the parliament are interested in efficiency analysis as postulated. 
This result can be explained by the fact that members of the parliament as generalists are too 
short on time to do the search and analysis to discover firsthand the political meaning of 
available research. Thus, it is more likely that members of the parliament will use the 
systematic evidence feed in by the civil servants and other specialized organizations in earlier 
stages of the policy making process (see Widmer 2009). This fact holds especially true for 
Switzerland: The Federal Parliament is not made up of professional parliamentary deputies. 
The members of both chambers exercise their mandates as an accessory activity and are only 
supported by a very small staff. 
Hypothesis 3 postulates that opponents are more likely to refer to efficiency analysis than 
proponents. The question of efficiency is thus considered as a more powerful argument to 
defeat than to promote a policy measure. Unfortunately, our empirical data does not allow 
testing this hypothesis profoundly because only in the case ‘coercive measures II’ (No. 10) 
the available efficiency analysis does provide information that can be used to argue against 
the revision. In all other cases, the efficiency analyses rather point in the direction of the 
revisions. In the case ‘coercive measure II’ (No. 10)’, the efficiency analysis is used as 
expected by the opponents of the revision (see Table 8). The following quote of a statement of 
a member of the National Council illustrates the argumentation: “The report of the 
Parliamentary Administration Control about the coercive measure has shown clearly that most 
of the removals are carried out within three months. A further tightening does not result in 
anything else than higher detention costs.” (Statement of B. Heim, translated by the authors, 
Official Bulletin, Summer Session 2005: 1196). However, such arguments were present, but 
arguments about the effectiveness and normative implications such as the proportionality of 
these measures were taken up more frequently. In the other cases, opponents did only refer to 
efficiency analysis to criticize its scientific quality. In four cases (No. 2, 3, 4 and 6) we 
observed an active creation and diffusion of efficiency analyses by proponents of the 
revisions. However, as outlined above, efficiency analysis can not be considered as very 
influential and intensively used systematic evidence in these cases. 
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Table 8: User of efficiency information (EI): Proponents vs. opponents 
Case 
no. 
Policy measure (case) Proponents Opponents Support 
for H3 
1 Speed limitation in residential areas Considered as not very 
relevant 
Do not refer to EI yes 
2 Cascade system Do not refer to EI no 
3 Two-phase driver-training system Do not refer to EI no 
4 BAC limit 
Create, diffuse, use 
Criticize scientific quality
Do not refer to EI 
Criticize scientific quality 
no 
6 Heroin-assisted treatment Create, diffuse, use Request detailed economic 
evaluation, do not refer to 
the available EI 
no 
10 Coercive measures II Criticize (scientific) 
quality 
Diffuse, use EI yes 
EI = efficiency information; BAC = blood alcohol concentration. 
Operationalization: References to EI in parliamentary debates, official policy documents (documents of the 
consultation procedure, messages (policy proposals) of the Federal Council to the Federal Parliament), 
assessments of the relevance of EI by the interviewees. 
 
7 Conclusion 
Times of public budget deficits and recent steering reforms, raises interest in efficiency 
analysis and its influence in political decision making processes. This paper provided some 
insights about the current standing of efficiency analysis in legislative revisions at the Swiss 
federal level. To analyze the role of efficiency analysis this paper proposed to focus on both 
effectiveness and efficiency information and to analyze whether efficiency information does 
make a difference and what type of actor uses such information. For this purpose, we first 
elaborated a typology of systematic evidence that differentiates on the one hand between 
different levels of effects (output, outcome, impact) of a policy and on the other, between the 
relation of input and effects of a policy measured in natural units or monetary terms. This 
typology allows to systematically classify systematic evidence dealing with the effectiveness 
and efficiency of a policy measure. 
Based on this typology, we argued that systematic evidence covering several types of 
information is more likely to be influential in a revision process than systematic evidence that 
provides only information on the output of a policy measure. This hypothesis is in accordance 
with existing findings showing that certainty of the state of knowledge regarding the causal 
framework of a policy measure does determine the influence of this knowledge (Esterling 
2004). Additionally, we postulated that generalists (politicians etc.) and opponents of a policy 
revision are more likely to use efficiency information than specialists (specialised bureaucrats 
etc.) or proponents of a policy proposal. Especially the first distinction between generalists, 
elected members of the government and parliament on the one hand, and specialists, civil 
servants and third parties directly involved in the implementation of the policy measure on the 
other hand, has so far received little attention in research that mainly concentrated on civil 
servants (Pollitt 2006). Therefore, this hypothesis was formulated on an ad-hoc basis, but in 
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line with existing findings emphasizing the need of information of the users to be a crucial 
factor. In contrast, the differentiation between proponents and opponents to analyze the 
contents of arguments is quite obvious and common. However, little is known about the 
specific implications of this distinction on the use of systematic evidence (for a rare example 
see Esterling 2004).  
In methodological terms, the present paper is based on ten qualitative case studies of revision 
processes dealing with a policy measure. The cases are embedded in six policy reforms and 
belong to three different policy fields: Traffic safety, health and asylum. Thus, our analysis 
covers a wide range of distinct cases. First, we identified the relevant systematic evidence and 
classified it according to the proposed typology. Then, we traced the influence of the 
identified systematic evidence in the entire revision processes based on document analysis 
and expert interviews. Such an analysis has the advantage to be able to deal with the dynamics 
of a revision process. 
The analysis of the available systematic evidence showed that it can not be taken for granted 
that efficiency analysis is available in advance of a decision, only in six out of ten cases such 
information was available. Furthermore, the available amount and types of available 
systematic evidence varied considerably between the cases. Less and lower types of 
systematic evidence was available in the asylum policy revisions compared to the traffic 
safety revisions. This leads to the conclusion that the production of systematic evidence is not 
institutionalized in the field of asylum policy. In the field of health policy, we have both 
extremes: a case with nearly a perfect situation of systematic evidence and a case where 
systematic evidence covered only few types of information. 
As expected, the case studies showed that systematic evidence covering several information 
types, thus including not only effectiveness but also efficiency information, was more 
influential in the revision processes than systematic evidence covering only few information 
types. Thus, this analysis gives further support to the existing research focussing on the 
strengths in terms of certainty of the state of knowledge (Esterling 2004). However, the 
detailed analysis of the cases showed that efficiency information was in no case very 
influential: We found only few references to such analysis in policy documents and interviews 
indicating that involved actors paid more attention to effectiveness information. Thus, we 
could sum up that efficiency information did not make the difference, did not explain why 
systematic evidence was highly influential in the respective cases, but it complemented 
systematic evidence that was perceived in general as influential. Our study faces the limitation 
of a restricted number of investigated cases, especially cases with available efficiency 
information and where systematic evidence was influential. We have unfortunately not found 
a single case where efficiency analysis has played a crucial role. 
The analysis at the level of actor types did not provide very conclusive results: We could not 
identify a specific type of actor that seems to be particularly interested in efficiency 
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information. We found support for the hypothesis that specialists, civil servants directly 
responsible for the policy measures, consider efficiency analysis not as very important 
information in the revision processes. Generalists, elected members of the parliament did, but 
they very rarely refer to efficiency information. These findings might be explained by the 
limited capacities of members of the Federal Parliament to process systematic evidence. 
Lacking resources, they seemed to relay primarily on systematic evidence selected and 
provided by the federal administration, secondarily on systematic evidence diffused by non-
governmental (lobby-)organisations. Additionally, these findings might result also from the 
fact that we identified only one efficiency analysis that provided arguments to reject the 
respective policy revision and thus, we could not appropriately test the hypothesis postulating 
that opponents are more likely to use efficiency analysis. To test this argument further 
research including preferably also failed revision processes are necessary. 
To conclude, this paper illustrates that efficiency analysis has had a rather minor influence in 
the legislative revisions in Switzerland. However, the presented analysis faces some limitation 
with respected not only to the limited number of conducted case studies but also with 
respected to the selected policy fields. The analysis did not include policy fields such as 
economic, financial or transport where we could expect higher affinities to efficiency 
information because the instruments of efficiency analysis seems to be more developed in this 
areas. Thus, further research in such policy fields would provide additional insights to the role 
of efficiency analysis in policy revision processes. 
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9 Appendix 
Table 9: Composition of the selected interviewees 
Case 
no. 
Policy measure (case) Producers of SE, 
researchers* 
Other invol-
ved actors** 
Federal 
offices 
Parliamentar
y committees 
Total
1 Speed limitation in residential areas  2 4 2 -- 8 
2 Cascade system 1  2  3 
3 Two-phase driver-training system 1  3  4 
4 BAC limit  1  3  4 
5 Moratorium for new service providers 1 4 1 3 9 
6 Heroin-assisted treatment 3 1 1 3 7***
7 Social assistance exclusion 1 3 7 4 15 
8 Coercive measures I 2 2 6 4 14 
9 Extended social assistance exclusion 1 3 3 5 12 
10 Coercive measures II 2 2 3 6 13 
In total 45 interviews were conducted within our research project, 35 by Kathrin Frey and 10 by Christine 
Zollinger (2009) as part of her master thesis. She kindly provided the interview data for this analysis. Some 
interviewees provided us with insights for several policy measures. 
* Producer of SE (systematic evidence) and researcher who are not employees of a federal office. 
** E.g. interest organisations, expert commissions, cantonal authorities 
*** One of the interviewees was at the same time producer of systematic evidence as well as member of the 
parliamentary committee in charge of the revision 
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Table 10: Information value-matrices: traffic safety  
Case no. 2, Cascade system: Administrative sanctions for repeat offenders (Total studies: 1) 
 measure of input measure of effects output outcome impact 
money   1 efficiency information money  
natural units   1 
effectiveness information non-monetary/no information natural units/money   1 
Values: Number of studies containing the respective information type 
Value of information type coverage: 12 
Case no. 3, Introduction of a two-phase driver-training licensing system (Total studies : 4) 
 measure of input measure of effects output outcome impact 
money   1 efficiency information money  
natural units   1 
effectiveness information non-monetary/no information natural units/money  3 1 
Values: Number of studies containing the respective information type 
Value of information type coverage: 14 
Case no. 4, Reduction of the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) limit to 0,05 % (Total studies : 3) 
 measure of input measure of effects output outcome impact 
money   1 efficiency information money  
natural units   1 
effectiveness information non-monetary/no information natural units/money 2 2 2 
Values: Number of studies containing the respective information type 
Value of information type coverage: 15 
 
Table 11: Information value-matrices: Health 
Case no. 5, 2nd Extension of the ‘moratorium’ for new medical services providers (Total studies: 4) 
 measure of input measure of effects output outcome impact 
money    efficiency information money  
natural units    
effectiveness information non-monetary/no information natural units/money 2 2 3 
Values: Number of studies containing the respective information type 
Value of information type coverage: 6 
Case no. 6, Heroin-assisted treatment (Total studies : 17) 
 measure of input measure of effects output outcome impact 
money   3 efficiency information money  
natural units 3 3 1 
effectiveness information non-monetary/no information natural units/money 8 17 9 
Values: Number of studies of the respective information type  
Value of information type coverage: 20 
 
 30
Table 12: Information value-matrices: Asylum 
Case no. 7, Social assistance exclusion of all asylum seekers whose applications were not considered for 
formal reason (non-entry decision). (Total studies: 4) 
 measure of input measure of effects output outcome impact 
money    efficiency information money  
natural units    
effectiveness information non-monetary/no information natural units/money 3 1  
Values: Number of studies of the respective information type 
Value of information type coverage: 3 
Case no. 9, Social assistance exclusion of all rejected asylum seekers (Total studies: 5) 
 measure of input measure of effects output outcome impact 
money    efficiency information money  
natural units    
effectiveness information non-monetary/no information natural units/money 3 3 2 
Values: Number of studies of the respective information type 
Value of information type coverage: 6 
Case no. 10, More severe coercive measures II (Total studies: 5) 
 measure of input measure of effects output outcome impact 
money    efficiency information money  
natural units 1 1  
effectiveness information non-monetary/no information natural units/money 2 4 2 
Values: Number of studies of the respective information type 
Value of information type coverage: 11 
 
 
